הסיווג ושיטת התקיפה משקפים את דיווחי המקורות. תיאורים מפורטים מוצגים בשפת המקור; לקריאת התחקיר המלא ניתן לפתוח את הקישור המצורף.
DefiLlamaתיאור המקור באנגלית
The attacker obtained control of WealthManagementV2’s owner privileges, suspected to have resulted from a leaked owner private key. After taking ownership, the attacker used updatePlanConfig() to set period=0 and interestMultiplier/unlockMultiplier=528,300,000. Because the privileged configuration function had no timelock or parameter bounds, the attacker could invest and immediately redeem to generate artificially inflated interest, then use a second investment to unlock and withdraw the resulting balance
SlowMistתיאור המקור באנגלית
The WealthManagementV2 contract lost funds after owner privileges were suspected of being illegally transferred (possibly due to a leaked private key). The attacker-controlled owner instantly set extreme plan parameters (period=0, interestMultiplier/unlockMultiplier=528,300,000) via updatePlanConfig with no timelock or bounds, minted inflated interest by investing and redeeming in the same transaction, then unlocked and withdrew the funds via a second investment, resulting in a loss of 26,414 USDT.
הסיווג ושיטת התקיפה משקפים את דיווחי המקורות. תיאורים מפורטים מוצגים בשפת המקור; לקריאת התחקיר המלא ניתן לפתוח את הקישור המצורף.
DefiLlamaתיאור המקור באנגלית
The attacker obtained control of WealthManagementV2’s owner privileges, suspected to have resulted from a leaked owner private key. After taking ownership, the attacker used updatePlanConfig() to set period=0 and interestMultiplier/unlockMultiplier=528,300,000. Because the privileged configuration function had no timelock or parameter bounds, the attacker could invest and immediately redeem to generate artificially inflated interest, then use a second investment to unlock and withdraw the resulting balance
SlowMistתיאור המקור באנגלית
The WealthManagementV2 contract lost funds after owner privileges were suspected of being illegally transferred (possibly due to a leaked private key). The attacker-controlled owner instantly set extreme plan parameters (period=0, interestMultiplier/unlockMultiplier=528,300,000) via updatePlanConfig with no timelock or bounds, minted inflated interest by investing and redeeming in the same transaction, then unlocked and withdrew the funds via a second investment, resulting in a loss of 26,414 USDT.
