On April 14, 2026, an attacker created 25 accounts to farm MONA using a flash loan and Venus USDT borrow, exploiting flawed accounting in the deferred burn mechanism to drain 60,950 USDT from the liquidity pair.

On April 14, 2026, attackers exploited the BurnAddress mechanism in the MONA token on BSC via a Deferred LP Burn / reserve manipulation attack. The attacker first farmed 10,000 MONA through 25 fresh accounts, sold 9,900 MONA to create a deferred burn credit, bought out most of the pool's MONA inventory, then triggered BurnAddress.burn() with a zero-value transferFrom to burn MONA directly from the LP and call sync(). This left the MONA/USDT pair with near-zero MONA but almost full USDT reserves. Finally, selling the remaining ~100 MONA drained a large amount of USDT. Flash loans from Moolah and borrowing from Venus were used for funding and fully repaid in the same transaction. The root cause was non-atomic handling in _handleSell() and burnsellMona(): USDT payout happened immediately while MONA burn was deferred and could be triggered later, breaking the AMM invariant.