הסיווג ושיטת התקיפה משקפים את דיווחי המקורות. תיאורים מפורטים מוצגים בשפת המקור; לקריאת התחקיר המלא ניתן לפתוח את הקישור המצורף.
DefiLlamaתיאור המקור באנגלית
The attacker built a leveraged TONIC/tTONIC collateral position through 98 recursive operations, then transferred TONIC directly into the tTONIC contract twice without minting corresponding tTONIC, increasing the tTONIC exchange rate outside the normal deposit path. The attacker also increased TONIC’s market price, while Tectonic’s price feed relied on VVS Finance and Crypto.com Exchange pricing without smoothing or a circuit breaker. These effects compounded the collateral valuation, allowing the attacker to borrow and remove more than $120M of assets from Tectonic’s lending markets within roughly 11 minutes
SlowMistתיאור המקור באנגלית
On August 30, 2026, an attacker looped borrowing and re-supplying Tectonic’s governance token TONIC as collateral while manipulating its price by ~195x, then borrowed about $120.4 million from multiple Tectonic lending markets in one transaction. Cronos halted and rolled back the chain, restoring on-chain assets to the pre-exploit state; approximately $9.19 million that left Cronos before the halt remains unrecovered. Supply and borrow remain paused.
הסיווג ושיטת התקיפה משקפים את דיווחי המקורות. תיאורים מפורטים מוצגים בשפת המקור; לקריאת התחקיר המלא ניתן לפתוח את הקישור המצורף.
DefiLlamaתיאור המקור באנגלית
The attacker built a leveraged TONIC/tTONIC collateral position through 98 recursive operations, then transferred TONIC directly into the tTONIC contract twice without minting corresponding tTONIC, increasing the tTONIC exchange rate outside the normal deposit path. The attacker also increased TONIC’s market price, while Tectonic’s price feed relied on VVS Finance and Crypto.com Exchange pricing without smoothing or a circuit breaker. These effects compounded the collateral valuation, allowing the attacker to borrow and remove more than $120M of assets from Tectonic’s lending markets within roughly 11 minutes
SlowMistתיאור המקור באנגלית
On August 30, 2026, an attacker looped borrowing and re-supplying Tectonic’s governance token TONIC as collateral while manipulating its price by ~195x, then borrowed about $120.4 million from multiple Tectonic lending markets in one transaction. Cronos halted and rolled back the chain, restoring on-chain assets to the pre-exploit state; approximately $9.19 million that left Cronos before the halt remains unrecovered. Supply and borrow remain paused.
