Addresses, related to the flash loan attack: The attacker - 0x882d72aaae187f54e85c7a0cb19dfec5316cd9aa Smart contract with the malicious logic - 0x9e0259437804c7bf175421a451bc80611a0b93c3 Transaction behind the attack: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x600a869aa3a259158310a233b815ff67ca41eab8961a49918c2031297a02f1cc The attacker: - took a flash loan of 21k ETH from dYdX - swapped 50 ETH to 107k CHEESE at UniswapV2 - added 107k CHEESE and corresponding 78 ETH into the liquidity pool at UniswapV2 and got UNI_V2 LP tokens back - minted sUSD_V2 tokens with all LP tokens got from Step 3. This allowed the exploit contract to use those LP tokens as collateral for borrowing crypto assets from Cheese Bank - raised the CHEESE price at UniswapV2 by swapping 20k ETH to 288k CHEESE, making the UNI_V2 LP tokens more valuable as collaterals Cheese Bank. This is the crucial step in this incident since the Cheese Bank uses the amount of WETH in a liquidity pool to estimate the price of the corresponding LP token. The manipulated UNI_V2-CHEESE-ETH pool (with 20k+ WETH) allowed the attacker to drain all the USDC, USDT, and DAI withheld by Cheese Bank by legit borrow () calls - refreshed the price feeds of Cheese Bank. The attacker intentionally invoked the CheesePriceOracle::refresh () function to refresh the price of the UNI_V2-CHEESE-ETH LP token which is derived from the amount of WETH in the liquidity pool and the ETH price derived from the UNI_V2-USDT-ETH pool. Specifically, the CheesePriceOracle::fetchLPAnhorPrice () function gets the wEthBalance of UNI_V2-CHEESE-ETH contract. With the passed in ethPrice , the totalValue is derived by wEthBalance x 2 x ethPrice . Therefore, the unit price of the UNI_V2-CHEESE-ETH LP token is computed by totalValue / totalSupply of LP tokens . It means if the attacker could somehow increase the amount of WETH in a pool (e.g., addLiquidity () with flash loan ether), the price of the LP token would be increased - drained the USDC, USDT, DAI withheld by Cheese Bank by borrow () calls. Besides the 2M USDC, 1.23M USDT and 87k DAI are borrowed from Cheese Bank. The exact balance of USDC/USDT/DAI is borrowed by the exploit contract - swapped 288k CHEESE bac
Cheese Bank
אירוע שתועד ב-De.Fi REKT. הסיווג: אורקלים ומניפולציית מחיר.
הדיווחים על האירוע
| מקור | תאריך במקור | הערכת נזק | כספים שהוחזרו | שיטה כפי שדווחה |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| De.Fi REKT | 6 בנוב׳ 2020 | $3.3M | $0 | Flash Loan Attack |
מה ידוע על המתקפה?
הסיווג ושיטת התקיפה משקפים את דיווחי המקורות. תיאורים מפורטים מוצגים בשפת המקור; לקריאת התחקיר המלא ניתן לפתוח את הקישור המצורף.
תמונת המצב נאספה ב-19 בנוב׳ 2026. הסכומים נקובים בדולרים ומשקפים הערכות מקור. סכום לא ידוע אינו אפס; סכום שהוקפא אינו בהכרח כסף שהוחזר.
